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Abstract: The extent of publishing in predatory journals in economics is examined in 
this paper. A simple model of researcher behavior is presented to explore those factors 
motivating an economist or other academic to publish in predatory journals as defined by 
Beall (2015). Beall’s lists are then employed to identify predatory journals and publishers 
included in the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) archives. Once identified, the 
affiliations of authors publishing in these outlets are determined in order to identify the 
characteristics of those publishing in such outlets. The geographic dispersion of 
authorship is widespread. A very small subset of authors is registered on RePEc. Slightly 
more than forty percent of registered authors who publish in predatory journals in the 
data set have six or fewer publications, and hence might be considered inexperienced. A 
surprising number of authors who are in the RePEc top 5% also published in predatory 
journals in 2015.  
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Introduction 
Within the educational system of the developed world, the distinguishing feature 
that sets universities apart from other components of the system is the expectation that 
faculty contribute to the knowledge base of their specialties. The growth of the Internet 
and, more generally, globalization has coincided with, or perhaps fostered, an increased 
emphasis on scholarly publishing in academia worldwide. Promotion, merit pay, tenure 
(where it exists), and hiring and firing decisions in many universities depend on the 
publications of faculty members. Standards, of course, still differ within and across 
countries, but an institution that does not demand some evidence of scholarly activity is 
in the minority in most places, and a rarity in many. 
The increase in research output has been accompanied by an expansion in the 
number of journals. The open access journal model is a relatively inexpensive form for 
publishing scientific work contributing to the expansion in the number of outlets for 
scholarly communication [see West, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom (2014) and the citations 
therein]. Certainly, some open access journals follow the ethical standards and practices 
one expects from the traditional print journals; most importantly, they have a thorough 
review process, so that only those papers deemed to contribute to the body of knowledge 
in economics are actually accepted for publication. Unfortunately, some open access 
outlets perform cursory reviews of submissions, with accepted papers published 
contingent on the authors’ payment of a substantial fee. Shen and Björk (2015) succinctly 
describe the process on the first page of their paper“…publishers repositioned 
themselves as service providers to the authors, publishing with them, rather than 
seeing themselves as content providers to readers.” Jeffrey Beall maintains a list of 
publishers of such journals and another of stand-alone journals that perform little or no 
review, charge post-acceptance publication fees, and satisfy his criteria for classification 
as predatory at the Scholarly Open Access blog (http://scholarlyoa.com/). Of course, the 
pay-for-publication practice has a long history when applied to books with this sector of 
book publishers pejoratively referred to as ‘vanity press.’ 
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The extent of publishing in predatory journals in economics is examined in this 
paper.1 Beall’s lists are employed to identify predatory journals and publishers included 
in the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) archives. It is assumed that a publisher on 
Beall’s list publishes only predatory journals since it is hard to imagine a viable business 
model in which a publisher has sufficiently lax standards in some journals so that they 
would be classified as predatory and high standards for others. Once identified, the 
affiliations and other characteristics of authors publishing in these outlets are compiled. A 
priori, one expects that most publications in predatory journals will be from authors in 
junior ranks outside the industrialized countries  since these countries are more likely to 
have low-ranked universities with weaker publishing standards than those in the 
developed world.  
 
Literature 
Several studies have looked at publishing in open access journals. Bohannon (2013) 
submitted virtually identical papers on the anticancer properties of a type of lichen to 304 
open access journals. The methodology described in the paper was intentionally flawed in 
ways that should have been obvious and noted during a competent review. The paper was 
accepted by more than half of the journals to which it was submitted. Djuric (2015) 
discusses the academic setting in Serbia after 2007 when state universities began 
requiring publications in journals having Thomson Reuters (TR) impact factors for 
completion of a Ph.D or promotion. Djuric describes the submission of a sham paper to a 
journal with TR impact factor in which “hundreds of Serbian scientists published 
hundreds of articles …in only a couple of years.” (page 184) The journal in question 
charges for publication after acceptance. The purpose of the sham paper was to test the 
authors’ impression that the journal conducted little if any review of submissions. The 
article was accepted the day after submission. No referee reports were provided with the 
acceptance e-mail. After payment of an invoice for €290 the journal scheduled 
publication in a subsequent issue. 
																																																								1	One	of	the	authors	recently	served	on	his	department’s	recruitment	committee.	About	half	of	the	applicants	had	one	or	more	publications	in	journals	on	Beall’s	list	of	stand-alone	predatory	journals,	or	published	by	a	company	on	Beall’s	list	of	predatory	publishers.		
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Shen and Björk (2015) draw a sample of journals from Beall’s lists of predatory 
journals and publishers to determine the characteristics of the journals and details of the 
authors. Almost forty-five percent of the journals are published in India or North 
America. The publisher’s location could not be determined for nearly twenty-seven 
percent of the journals. In a separate sample of contributors, more than seventy-five 
percent of the authors are from Asia and Africa. The average APC or article processing 
(or publishing) charge is $178. Xia (2015) compiles information on the APCs of 214 
journals on Beall’s list in early 2014. Most predatory journals he examines charge less 
than $100 for the APC, and few charged more than $200. 
Omobowale (2014) asserts that such criteria as impact factor are generally ignored 
in the evaluation of faculty publications when making appointment and promotion 
decisions in Nigerian universities. Instead, the primary criterion for promotion is whether 
the papers are in journals published outside Nigeria. He conducts interviews with thirty 
faculty members in two public universities to ascertain their views regarding publications 
in predatory journals. He also interviews eight senior Nigerian faculty involved in hiring 
and promotion in these same universities. The four most common reasons given for 
publishing in predatory journals are promotion of other faculty based on such 
publications, the desire for quick promotion, a lack of oversight in evaluations, and 
ignorance. It is noteworthy that three of the four justifications for publishing in predatory 
journals suggest an optimizing decision by a faculty member based on full information 
about the predatory journals and the promotion process, rather than a lack of knowledge 
regarding the quality of the target journal. 
Xia et al. (2015) are interested in the characteristics of authors publishing in 
predatory journals. They select seven pharmaceutical science journals on Beall’s list, 
referred to as group 1 in their discussion. Using the author data available from the 
journals and the Web of Science, Xia et al. compile data on authors who published in one 
of the Beall’s list journals in 2013.  For comparison they select a second group of five 
open access, pharmaceutical journals that rejected Bohannon’s sham paper and a third 
group of five open access journals with high impact factors from the Public Library of 
Science (PLoS) and compile data on authors of papers these two groups of journals in 
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2013.2 None of the journals in the comparison groups appeared on Beall’s list at the time 
of the study. Their data show that 75% of predatory journal authors are from South Asia, 
especially India, and 14% from Africa. About 15% of authors in the second group of 
journals and less than 5% of PLoS journal articles are by researchers in these two 
locations. Xia et al. also find that group 1 authors have fewer publications and are cited 
less than group 2 authors leading to their overall conclusion that the authors of articles in 
predatory journals are typically inexperienced and from developing countries. 
 
Theory 
What does a traditional journal do? Expanding on the succinct description of 
journals as ‘content providers to readers’ (Shen and Bjorkdate??), a traditional journal 
screens paper quality for its subscribers. So as not to impose the entire cost of screening 
on the reader and recognizing that publishing a paper creates a positive return to the 
author(s), a submission fee is often required before a paper is assessed for quality. 
Revenue is derived from subscriptions and submission fees. The upfront submission fee 
makes the editorial decision to accept or reject independent from the journal’s revenue 
source.  
What does a predatory journal do? Again from Shen and Bjork, the publisher has 
become a “service provider to the authors.” A predatory journal or publisher provides two 
services to authors; it offers a rapid decision, albeit based on a cursory or non-existent 
review of the paper, and it sells space in a journal to authors.3 If any screening for article 
quality takes place it is limited. An article processing charge is imposed on the author(s) 
after acceptance creating an incentive to accept papers in order to increase revenue. 
Predatory journals are open access so publication costs are relatively low compared to a 
print journal. The marginal cost of publishing a paper is likely very small. 
We abstract from journal behavior in this paper, instead focusing on the motivation 
of authors with a simple model. Papers are unpublished. Publications are just that; 
published papers. Suppose there are two kinds of papers: high quality and low quality. 																																																								2	Given	the	large	number	of	papers	in	the	PLoS	journals	they	started	with	the	first	issue	of	each	and	compiled	the	author	characteristics,	stopping	once	they	had	data	for	300	authors.	3	For	a	particularly	egregious	case	see	Mazieres	and	Kohler	(2005)	and	the	related	story	in	https://scholarlyoa.com/2014/11/20/bogus-journal-accepts-profanity-laced-anti-spam-paper/	.	
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With nl the number of low quality papers, and nh the number of high quality papers 
produced by an author, the effort cost of producing papers is 𝑐 !!!!  for high quality papers, 
and !!!!  for low quality papers, with c > 1.  
All papers have a 100% chance of being published in bad journals.4 Low quality 
papers have zero chance of being published in good journals. High quality papers have a 
probability θ of being published in good journals, where θ ∈ [0,1] is a measure of 
individual ability. Thus a high quality paper will be published in a bad journal with a 
probability of 1-θ. 
Universities value the quality-weighted number of articles, and will pay v for a 
quality-weighted article. Thus, compensation is given by  
v[α (# of publications in good journals) + (1-α) (# of publications in bad journals)], with 
½ < α < 1. It is assumed publications in good journals are never valued less than 
publications in bad journals, so ½ < α. If α = ½, all publications would be valued the 
same. If α = 1, only publications in good journals would be valued. Clearly both v and α 
may vary across universities. 
For simplicity, assume an author can only work on one type of paper.5 First 
consider an individual who produces high quality papers. The individual’s objective is: 
 max!! 𝑣𝑛! 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 −  !"!!!                                                         (1) 
 
We then have: 
 
 nh = 
!! 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 .                                                                             (2) 
 
Now consider an individual who produces low quality papers. The author’s objective is: 																																																								
4 Allowing for the fact that some papers do not get published anywhere would not materially affect the 
results. 
5 One way to justify this assumption is if there is some fixed cost of producing high quality papers, a cost 
for which some universities compensate a professor. For example, summer research support may be taken 
away if sufficient good journal articles are not produced. 	
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 max!! 𝑣 1− 𝛼 𝑛! −  !!!! , yielding                                                                    (3) 
 nl = v(1-α).                                                                                                           (4) 
 
1. How would behavior differ for similar individuals producing different types of 
papers? 
Suppose individuals with the same value of θ are employed at institutions with the 
same values of v and α, but where some are provided the support to produce high quality 
papers (see footnote five), and others do not receive such support. We first consider who 
would produce more papers. Since all papers are assumed to be published, this also 
means more publications. Using equations (2) and (4), individuals producing high quality 
papers would produce more papers and publications (in good and bad journals) than 
individuals producing low quality papers if: 
 
 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃  > c 1− 𝛼 .                                                                    (5)  
 
If α = ½ all publications are valued the same so that LHS(5) = ½ <  RHS(5) = c/2 thus 
fewer high quality papers are produced than low quality papers. Even if a lump sum 
payment, such as a summer research grant, were given to those who produced high 
quality papers there would still be more low quality papers produced than high quality 
papers, and there would be more total publications by those who produced low quality 
papers than by those producing high quality papers when α = ½. If α = 1 there is no value 
to low quality papers so that LHS(5) = 1 and the  RHS(5) = 0. Without reward for 
publications in bad journals, no one would produce low quality papers. 
Let us also consider the midpoint of the range for α, α = ¾. Then LHS(5) = ¼ + 
!!, 
and RHS(5) = 
!!. If θ > !!!!  then LHS(5) > RHS(5), so those who produce good papers would 
produce more papers and publications than individuals producing low quality papers. 
With the maximum value of θ equal to one, some individuals producing high quality 
papers would produce more papers and publications than they would if they produced 
low quality papers if c < 3. These results suggest that for a high enough level of ability, θ, 
and a high enough reward for publications in good journals versus publications in bad 
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journals, α, one would produce more papers and publications focusing on high quality 
papers than on low quality papers, even though the former are more costly to produce. 
Again consider those with the same θ who are employed at institutions with the 
same values of v and α, where only some are provided the support to produce high 
quality papers. Would the same individual have more publications in bad journals by 
focusing on low quality papers than high quality papers? One who produces low quality 
papers has v(1-α) publications in bad journals, and the number published in bad journals 
if the same person produced high quality papers is !(!!!)! 𝛼𝜃 + 1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 . 
Focusing on low quality papers would result in more publications in bad journals if: 
 
 c(1-α) > 1− 𝜃 𝛼𝜃 +  1− 𝛼 1− 𝜃 .                                                           (6) 
 
 If α = ½, LHS(6) = 
!! > RHS(6) = !!!! , but, if α = 1, LHS(6) = 0 < RHS(6) = θ(1-θ). 
Suppose α = ¾, so publications in good journals are paid three times as much as are 
publications in bad journals. If α = ¾, LHS(6) > RHS(6) when c > (1-θ)(1+2θ). Now  
(1-θ)(1+2θ) is maximized when θ = ¼ so that (1-θ)(1+2θ) = 1.125. Thus, unless c is very 
low or α is very high, it is likely that individuals with the same θ, and facing the same v 
and producing low quality papers would have more publications in bad journals than 
those who produce high quality papers. If α is very high, there is little reward for 
publications in low quality journals so few low quality papers would be produced.  
Conversely, using equation (2):  
 
 !!!!"  = !! 2𝜃 − 1 .                                                                                                  (7) 
 
Thus, at least for those with θ > ½, an increase in α increases the number of high quality 
papers produced and means more publications in bad and good journals for those who 
produce high quality papers. 
2. When would individuals choose papers of different qualities? 
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We have considered how individuals with the same ability, θ, and with the same 
payoffs for publication would differ depending on whether they produced high or low 
quality papers. Now we examine individuals who differ in θ, but face the same α and v, 
in order to see who would choose to produce either high or low quality papers. Using 
equations (1) – (4), the payoffs from producing high or low quality papers, πh and πl 
respectively are: 
 
 πh = 
!! !"! !!! !!! !!! ,                                                                                       (8) 
 πl = 
!! !!! !! .                                                                                                        (9) 
 
Canceling terms and taking the square root of both sides yields equation (10) 
showing that the payoff to producing high quality papers exceeds that of the production 
of low quality papers, πh  > πl, if 
 
 θ > !!! !!/!!!!!!!  ≡ θ*.                                                                                       (10) 
 Lim!→!/! 𝜃∗ = ∞, thus θ <θ* and all would produce low quality papers if good and 
bad publications were rewarded the same. At the other limit, lim!→! 𝜃∗ = 0, so that all 
would produce high quality papers if there were no reward for publications in bad 
journals. 
 Two factors have affected scholarship in recent years, particularly in business 
schools. First, for purposes of accreditation, publications per se for each faculty member 
have become more important suggesting a decrease in α, so that low ability faculty can 
meet publishing standards established for accreditation purposes. Second, acceptance 
rates at good journals appear to have declined. In our model, we can interpret the 
decrease in acceptance rates as an increase in c; it is more costly to produce high quality 
papers that might be accepted in good journals. Clearly !"∗!"  < 0, and !"∗!"  > 0 showing that 
a decrease in α or an increase in c raise θ*, causing more individuals to focus on low 
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quality papers that will be published in bad journals. The survey results reported by 
Omobowale appear to suggest a value of α ≈ ½ in the universities he studied in Nigeria. 
 
Data 
A list of journals showing the aggregate ranking for the last ten years on RePEc was 
downloaded on December 13, 2015. The list contained 1642 journals and shows the 
publisher of each journal. The list was reviewed to identify journals or publishers 
appearing on one of Beall’s lists. Thirty-nine journals from eighteen different publishers 
on the RePEc list are considered predatory in Beall’s classification.6 By their standings in 
the RePEc aggregate rankings, some of these journals might be considered good quality 
journals. Six of the predatory journals are ranked at number 500 or better and three are in 
the top 20% of RePEc journals by the aggregate ranking measure. 
After identification of the predatory journals, authors and titles of papers published 
by each journal in 2015 and appearing on RePEc were pasted into an Excel file on 27 
December 2015. Over the next two months each available 2015 issue of each predatory 
journal was reviewed to identify the affiliations of authors and, in cases of authors on 
RePEc, the number of publications of the author(s). By the time some journals were 
reviewed, additional issues of the journal had appeared on RePEc. In such instances the 
data set was not updated. Thus the data file generally does not include all papers 
published in 2015 by each journal and journals/publishers that promptly submit issues to 
RePEc will be overrepresented in the data set.  
Since the group of journals is restricted to those listed on RePEc, it should not be 
considered representative of the population of predatory publishers/journals. An implicit 
assumption of this study is that any journal listed in Research Papers in Economics is an 
economics journal. However the titles of many articles suggest that not all authors are 
economists. One of the characteristics used by Jeffrey Beall to identify a predatory 
publisher is that the journal is “excessively broad … to attract more articles,” [Beall 
(2015)] thus publications outside the usual scope of economics are not too surprising.  
																																																								6	Any	journal	from	a	publisher	on	Beall’s	list	is	considered	predatory	in	this	study.	The	criteria	used	by	Beall	can	be	downloaded	from	https://scholarlyoa.com/publishers/		
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Due to variations in lags between publication of an issue and its appearance on 
RePEc, the data set excludes some predatory journals listed on RePEc. Many journals 
had no 2015 issues on RePEc so the final data set includes twenty-seven journals. Of 
these twenty-seven journals, the number of 2015 papers from each journal in the data set 
ranges from one to two hundred and thirty-six for a total of 1284 published papers.  
Two characteristics of each author were identified from the initial examination of 
papers, the country in which the author’s university or, infrequently, business is located 
and whether the author is registered on RePEc. If registered on RePEc, the number of 
publications listed on RePEc is recorded. There are 2774 authors in the data set. Note that 
there are individual authors with more than one paper in predatory journals so the total 
number of authors exceeds the number of individuals. Variations in how an author’s 
name might appear on a paper led us to forgo any attempt to determine the number of 
different authors in the overall data set. However, we also examine more closely the 
much smaller subset of RePEc registered authors and readdress this issue. This portion of 
the data collection process was completed on February 28, 2016.  
The next step in the data collection process was to calculate the total number of 
authors and papers from each country. Two compilation issues arose. Many papers had 
coauthors from different countries. Letting n represent the number of authors, we 
assigned !! share of the authorship to the country of each author. Thus country of the first 
author and those of subsequent authors are weighted equally. In some instances a single 
author had affiliations across countries. Letting m represent the number of affiliations, the 
country associated with each affiliation was assigned !! share in a single authored paper. 
A few authors had affiliations in different countries and were coauthors with researchers 
from other countries. In such cases the country’s share for each affiliated institution was !!".  
A surprising and unexpected result is the widespread geographic distribution of 
authors. Authors from ninety countries are in the data set. Azerbaijan, Benin, Cuba, 
Ethiopia, Kosovo, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Rwanda, and Senegal are each 
represented by a single author. Table 1 shows the numbers of published papers and 
authors from the five countries most represented in the data. Contrary to the findings of 
	 12	
Xia et. al for pharmaceutical journals, no country or region dominates publishing in 
predatory journals on RePEc; the practice is widespread. Eight countries, the five listed in 
the table plus Pakistan, Kenya, and China account for nearly 50% of all publications in 
these journals and slightly more than half of all authors. 
Table 1: Countries Ordered by Number of Authors and Publications 
Country Number of 
Papers 
Percent of 
Total 
Country Number of 
Authors 
Percent of 
Total 
Iran 108 8.42% Iran 279 10.06% 
US 106 8.29 US 218 7.88 
Nigeria 93 7.21 Nigeria 204 7.34 
Turkey 90 7.04 Malaysia 186 6.69 
Malaysia 73 5.68 Turkey 176 6.34 
 
Again, we wish to emphasize that the data are not from a random sample of 
predatory journals. Some journals seem to attract most of their papers from authors in 
small subset of countries. For example, half of the twenty-four authors affiliated with 
South Korean schools published in a single journal. It may be that once an author learns 
of an ‘easy’ publication outlet he/she informs like-minded colleagues so that reputation 
affects the geographic distribution of submissions. 
As noted earlier a characteristic of some predatory journals is their very broad scope 
often reflected in the name. The International Journal of Academic Research in Business 
and Social Sciences and the Asian Journal of Empirical Research are two examples of 
journals in this data set with very broad topic areas. Thus it may not be surprising that 
many authors who have publications in the data set are not RePEc registered authors as 
many are unlikely to be economists. Only 146 authors, slightly more than 5% of the total 
number of authors in the data set, are registered. RePEc compiles the publications and 
working papers of each registered author allowing a crude assessment of the experience 
level of each registered author using the number of publications as a proxy. In particular 
we would like to know whether most economists publishing in predatory journals are 
relatively inexperienced with few publications thus, perhaps, somewhat ignorant of 
publishing standards or starting careers by seeking publication quantity over quality in 
research output. 
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Sixty-two registered authors have six or fewer publications listed on RePEc and 
eleven of these have just one. The number of publications includes the paper in the 
predatory journal in this data set. These economists might be considered inexperienced at 
least in terms of publishing. Another forty-seven registered authors have between ten and 
forty-nine publications. No attempt was made to identify how many of these publications 
were in predatory journals but the numbers of publications suggest that the authors in this 
second group have substantial experience in academic research.   
The big surprise from the data is that a large number of highly experienced authors 
also have publications in predatory journals. Sixteen authors of nineteen papers in the 
predatory journals included in this data set are top 5% authors in RePEc.7 Each of these 
top 5% authors has at least fifty publications listed in RePEc and seven have over one 
hundred. Top 5% authors are dispersed geographically. Three are in Taiwan, three in 
Australia, and two each work in the US, Germany, and Japan. One each is in Turkey, 
Pakistan, Mexico, and the Netherlands. Of course highly published researchers will tend 
to gravitate towards countries with better quality universities hence the lack of seriously 
underdeveloped economies on the list. Five of the nineteen papers involved a US 
coauthor in the top 5% in the RePEc rankings. 
What might motivate an experienced economist to publish in a predatory journal? 
One possibility is that an inexperienced coauthor handled the submission and the 
experienced author was ignorant of the journal’s low quality. In most cases it is 
impossible to reject this hypothesis, but three of the nineteen papers involving top 5% 
authors are single authored pieces and a fourth has two coauthors both of whom are in the 
top 5% RePEc so ignorance cannot be the only explanation. Furthermore, one top 5% 
economist was coauthor on three of the papers in the data set and two others in the 5% 
group had two coauthored papers. One person in the RePEc top 5% had two single 
authored articles in predatory journals in the data set. Apparently some of the top 5% 
authors are aware of the nature of these journals but choose to publish in these outlets 
regardless of quality. 
																																																								7	The	names	of	top	5%	are	shown	in	bold	font	in	the	author	index	of	RePEc	thus	allowing	easy	identification.	The	name	index	in	RePEc	was	consulted	on	April	5,	2016.	
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For those top 5% authors not being misled by inexperienced coauthors, what would 
such experienced researchers gain from low quality publications? One possibility is a 
relatively low value of α at their institutions. As suggested earlier, a low α can benefit a 
school in two ways. First, it makes it easier for low quality authors to achieve publication 
standards established for accreditation purposes. Second, a lower α increases the number 
of publications of an author producing low quality papers increasing both the ranking of 
individual and that of the affiliated institution. Indeed if those who evaluate a faculty 
member’s annual performance do not examine each publication, rather use an overall 
RePEc ranking as a measure of performance then a publication in a predatory journal 
indexed on RePEc will enhance the individual’s reward.  
 
Conclusions  
Unlike Xia et. al we find that authors of articles in predatory journals are widely 
dispersed geographically. The papers in our selective data set are from authors in ninety 
different countries although just eight countries account for about 50% of the papers and 
authors. The broad subject area of a typical predatory journal, attracting papers from 
many fields outside economics, may explain why only 146 of the 2774 authors in the data 
set are registered in RePEc. We view this result as a positive one since it suggests that 
only a small number of active researchers in economics are publishing in predatory 
journals.8  Of course, our sample is not a random one of predatory journals that publish 
papers on economic topics so further work is required to verify this conjecture. 
The inclusion of predatory journals on RePEc is problematic. Indeed some of the 
predatory journals prominently display the RePEc logo on their web pages in an apparent 
attempt to claim the journal is of high quality due to its affiliation with RePEc. More 
troubling is the apparent manipulation of the RePEc rankings through publishing in 
predatory journals even by economists ranked in the top 5% on RePEc. Although we did 
not examine the publications of all economists who published in predatory journals in our 
data set, it seems likely that some who rank outside the top 5% are also using 																																																								8	According	to	the	RePEc	website,	there	are	more	than	46,000	registered	authors.	If	we	regard	everyone	registered	on	RePEc	as	an	active	researcher,	then	perhaps	0.3%	published	in	the	predatory	journals	on	RePEc	in	2016.	The	list	of	146	registered	authors	in	the	data	set	was	not	screened	for	duplicates	so	the	actual	number	of	individuals,	thus	percentage,	may	be	even	smaller.	
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publications in predatory journals to raise their rankings in RePEc. Since only 146 
authors of the papers in our data set are registered in RePEc, the problem appears small at 
the moment but it certainly has the potential to worsen. 
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